In recent weeks, Taiwan has become a hot topic among world leaders, especially within Washington. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, visited California last week to meet with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, which prompted China to send warships and warplanes to surround the island and simulate bombing raids and military drills. This week’s threats from China to close down the airspace around Taiwan for three days leading up to the May G7 summit in Japan caused further strains and consternation. Many experts see these aggressive moves as foreshadowing a possible forced annexation of Taiwan by China, which considers the island part of its territory.��

These Notre Dame experts consider this attention turned toward Taiwan and what it means for U.S.-China relations from legal, strategic, militaristic, tactical and political standpoints.
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No international law has been broken by simulated actions

, the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and research professor of international dispute resolution, says simulating military attacks as China is doing in the context of Taiwan is no straightforward violation of international law.

“They do not compare with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” she said. “The U.N. Charter prohibits both threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. China’s simulations are classifiable as ‘threats to the peace’ and those, unlike invasion and other actual uses of force, may not violate the international law protecting Taiwan. The charter’s prohibition on the use of actual force is a codified version of ancient moral and legal principles. It does not change and cannot be undermined regardless of persistent state violations. It reaches beyond members of the U.N.”

O’Connell says “threats” are less concrete and less subject to a peremptory prohibition.

“States constantly undermine the prohibition on threats,” she said. “Recall Donald Trump’s threats of ‘fire and fury’ against North Korea in August 2017. Many states also consider U.S. military exercises to be threats. It is hard to say the ban on threats is binding today. And then there is the problem that Taiwan is not a member of the U.N. To enjoy protection from the use of force, Taiwan needs to rely on the ancient legal prohibition beyond the charter.��

“All of this means that the U.S. has no right to use military force in a case of simulated action,” she explained. “The best option is to bolster the U.N. Charter’s other mandate on China, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully. Leading by example with strict compliance with ancient and charter-based law is the way forward.”
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The US should prepare for possible blockades on Taiwan

, associate professor of political science, holds expertise in east Asian security, U.S.-China relations, Chinese history and Hong Kong. She recalled when the U.S. simultaneously sent senior officials and members of Congress to both Taiwan and China over a year ago, indicating that the U.S. was edging away from strategic ambiguity and moving closer to strategic clarity. Since then, of course, former Speaker Nancy Pelosi also visited Taipei.��

“President Biden has repeatedly stated that the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s military assistance if Taiwan is under attack,” Hui said. “And each time, the White House spokesperson would reiterate the U.S.’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy. Tsai’s recent high-level meetings and trips demonstrate the U.S.’s new policy of unspoken/de facto strategic clarity under the de jure ‘one China’ pledge.”

This move, Hui said, is intended to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from invading Taiwan without the need to actually use the military. “Beijing has reacted as if strategic clarity had become the official policy,” Hui explained. “It has demonstrated that it can impose a blockade on Taiwan. If conflicts break out, the most likely scenario is a blockade/siege, rather than direct military confrontations and an amphibious landing (to be saved for when Taiwan is subdued).��

“The U.S. should be making plans on how to supply and support Taiwan in case of a prolonged blockade to force Taiwan into submission.”��
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‘Restless, but not reckless, behavior’

Lionel Jensen, an associate professor of East Asian languages and cultures and concurrent associate professor of history, said that while there is cause for concern, China’s actions amount to “restless, but not reckless, behavior.”��

An expert on Chinese nationalism, Jensen said what is needed now is a proper contextualization of China’s reaction.

“It was termed a ‘measured hardline’ by official China media. This is not ominous but routine,” he said. “These exercises are similar —��although not as extensive — as those conducted in early August in response to former Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Then, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, the ‘mediating line,’ was crossed dozens of times and two missiles were shot over Taiwan into the Sea of Japan.”

These recent exercises also provided an opportunity for China to show off its improved aircraft carriers, Jensen noted, which could potentially be used to escalate tensions in the South China Sea.

“Of greater concern is the extent to which the aircraft carrier will be used in the South China Sea dispute that’s been ongoing since 2015,” he said, “and whether China will now begin to move in greater force with its weaponry into the different islands they’ve occupied there.”

Jensen said the most dangerous aspect of the simulations in Taiwan is the prospect of an accident:��a misfired missile or a collision between aircraft or ships.

“It’s important to note that every time China conducts such exercises over and around Taiwan, the latter scrambles its planes in defense against PRC (People’s Republic of China) fighter jets entering the Air Defense Zone —��more than 50 times during the most recent Operation Joint Sword and almost 70 sorties last August,” he said.

“In the end, it is essential that these activities be placed in the context of regular flights into Taiwan’s airspace that are conducted without the public relations pronouncements —��veiled threats — from the PRC Foreign Ministry and have been conducted periodically since the 1990s. China’s most recent actions are calculated, and the ‘measured hardline’ and/or ‘strong and resolute measures’ will continue to echo along the Taiwan Straits in the months ahead.”

Both sides should refrain from provocation

is an associate professor of global affairs in the Keough 91��Ƶ of Global Affairs and holds a concurrent appointment in the political science department. He says that U.S.-China relations appear to be trapped in a cycle of provocative action and reaction, with both sides showing a dangerously high tolerance for the risk of military conflict.

“Beijing’s rhetorical and military response to the recent President Tsai visit is meant to underscore just how provocative it finds high-level interactions between top U.S. officials and the Taiwanese leadership,” Jaros said. “While Speaker McCarthy stopped short of making a visit to Taipei, it was clear that even the decision to meet in California would be perceived by Beijing as part of a continued elevation of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

“Of course, Beijing routinely fails to recognize the way its own actions — a sustained military buildup, aggressive and intrusive military exercises, its policies toward Hong Kong and continued threats of coercion against Taiwan and any countries that would aid Taiwan — have altered the status quo ante in the Taiwan Strait and driven the U.S. and Taiwan closer.”��

Jaros said the U.S. should continue decrying efforts by China to use threats of military coercion to achieve its objectives in the Taiwan Strait, especially high-risk forms of military intimidation such as the recent waves of military exercises. However, the U.S. government also needs to rethink its approach to the Taiwan issue if the goal is to limit unintentional war.��

“This means avoiding highly provocative symbolic gestures in favor of quieter, but more substantive, ways of deterring military action against Taiwan,” Jaros explained, “such as continuing efforts to solidify regional alliances and partnerships and bolster Taiwan’s defensive capacity.”

Given that the U.S.-China blame game is unlikely to end anytime soon and high-level cooperation is severely restricted at present, Jaros said it is incumbent on each side to take unilateral steps to lower the political temperature and reduce the risk of conflict.��

“For the U.S., this does not mean backing down from existing treaty commitments or established security commitments abroad, but refraining from unnecessarily provocative gestures and signaling that we understand — even if we do not agree with — China’s key concerns.”

University of Notre Dame experts take a retrospective view on this one-year mark of the Russian invasion and provide insight into the war and its impact on Ukraine, the U.S. and the world.

International law, unique significance

, the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and research professor of international dispute resolution, is a co-author of “The Crisis in Ukraine,” editor of the book “What is War?” and former professional military educator for the U.S. Department of Defense.

“Russia’s war on Ukraine is uniquely egregious in the post-World War II era,” she said. “It has had a devastating global impact. Death from starvation in drought-stricken countries is linked to disruption of food and fuel supplies. The war’s toll on Ukraine’s people is incalculable.”

O’Connell says the invasion also stands out as only the second attempt to eliminate a member of the United Nations through aggression since the U.N. Charter codified the ancient moral and legal prohibition against the use of force in 1945.��

“Iraq made the first attempt in 1990 when it invaded Kuwait,” she said. “The difference now is that Russia’s war comes at a time when the charter prohibition on force has never been weaker. The world responded in 1990 with near unanimity. Condemnation at the U.N. was swift. A global coalition liberated Kuwait in 100 hours of combat. The defense of Ukraine is entering its second year. Between the liberation of Kuwait and the defense of Ukraine, the United States was in a position to build respect for the charter — to raise the prohibition’s pull to compliance. It did the opposite.

“While never attempting conquest as Russia has done, the U.S.’s flimsy legal justifications for using force have weakened the normative barriers to ultimate violence,” O’Connell said. “The U.S. has provided Ukraine with material support but must do more to support the prohibition. End targeted killings today and condemn all charter violations whether by adversary or ally. The law against war must prevail as the imperative lesson of Russia’s war on Ukraine.”
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‘A grave risk of escalation’

Ian Ona Johnson, the P. J. Moran Family Assistant Professor of Military History and an expert on Russian foreign relations and military technology, sees no end in sight for the conflict.

“Putin seems to believe that victory in Ukraine is now essential for the survival of his regime and that the West will eventually tire of supplying Ukraine,” Johnson said. “To continue the war, Russia began a partial mobilization of military reservists last September, followed by efforts to recruit large numbers of convicts and foreign fighters. A much larger call-up is expected sometime this spring. It is clear the Kremlin thinks it has the capacity to continue the war and resume the offensive.”

Many observers expect a major Russian effort aimed at securing most of the eastern half of the country in the late spring, Johnson noted.

“On the Ukrainian side, there is also little incentive to negotiate at the moment,” he said. “The country’s military has performed far better than outside observers expected. Zelenskyy has already made clear he will not negotiate while Russian troops are on Ukrainian territory. However, Ukraine’s manpower is limited; its economy is now in shambles. Ukraine’s war effort is almost entirely dependent on the provision of aid from Europe and the United States, which has been forthcoming, but in some countries like Germany is contentious.”��

It appears Ukraine will begin receiving much more advanced weaponry this spring, including German Leopard II and American Abrams tanks. The provision of F-16 fighter aircraft is also under consideration. While such moves improve Ukraine’s capacity to resist a new Russian offensive, Johnson said, they also run “a grave risk of escalation.”

“The picture as we begin the new year, unfortunately, is a grim one,” he said. “Without a major change in the political or military fortunes of the two sides, peace is unlikely.”
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Effects on agriculture, trade

Susanne Wengle, the Nancy R. Dreux Associate Professor of Political Science, holds expertise in post-Soviet transitions, food and agricultural systems, and comparative and international political economy. She has been following the effects of the war on Ukrainian agriculture, the products of which account for roughly 40 percent of the country’s export earnings. Wengle noted that when Russia’s army began encroaching upon Kyiv last February and March, it was less well-known that Russian naval forces attacked ships and blocked all commercial trade to and from Ukrainian ports.

“Not only is grain Ukraine’s most important export commodity, but Russia’s naval blockade of the Black Sea gave it tremendous leverage over world food prices,” Wengle said.��

“The most important turning point with regard to Ukrainian grain and its ability to reach global markets was the establishment of the grain corridor or, more formally, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which brought a limited and temporary easing of the blockade as part of an agreement between Ukraine and Russia, brokered by Turkey.”��

that this agreement, which was reached in November and requires renegotiations, had significant economic consequences for Ukraine — whose export earnings recovered and GDP improved — and the world, which saw food commodity prices fall.��

“Nevertheless, the BSGI is a limited, politically tenuous stop-gap measure — a ‘better than nothing’ solution against the backdrop of Russia’s continued control of the Black Sea region,” Wengle added.��

“It is important to keep in mind that as long as Russia can hold Ukrainian grain hostage, the Black Sea constitutes an effective blackmail opportunity it will likely use in the future to negotiate concessions in the West’s sanctions regime.”
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Shifting perceptions, creating unity

, a visiting fellow at the at the Keough 91��Ƶ of Global Affairs and an associate professor in the Department of Theory and Philosophy of Law at Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, Ukraine, focuses his research on theoretical and comparative issues of case law practice. He teaches courses on international and European standards of human rights, human rights in case law practice and the right to a fair trial. Stetsyk has been observing the global shifts in perception of Russia and Putin over the past year, and the qualitative and quantitative changes that have occurred within Ukrainian society.��

“If, before the aggression, the Russian regime pretended to be a civilized international actor that adheres to rules-based order, now — after targeted and massive terrorist attacks on peaceful Ukrainian cities and civilians, which qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity — the world has seen the true face of Putin and his regime,” Stetsyk said.��

“The world has stopped believing and fearing him. And this is one of the most important psychological factors of united efforts to defeat him.”

From a sociological perspective, Stetsyk stated that the sense of coherence and unity have significantly increased for the Ukrainian people, as evidenced by the rousing volunteer movements taking place during the first weeks and months of the war. Furthermore, according to Stetsyk, statistics show that the majority of Ukrainians find it unacceptable to cede territories in order to achieve peace and deem it necessary to continue the armed struggle despite the possibility of continued attacks.

“Before the war, society was divided by internal and petty, often artificially provoked, confrontations by politicians,” he said. “Now, it demonstrates unity in the principal issues of its existence. Ukrainians are united in the necessity to achieve victory and defeat the violent Russian regime.”

The qualitative and structural impact of the war on the Ukrainian population must also be considered, Stetsyk noted. With 18 percent of the population forced to evacuate as refugees abroad, and 15 percent internally displaced, the war’s short- and long-term consequences on Ukraine and other European countries are already being felt.��

“All that remains now for the Ukrainian people is to win this confrontation,” Stetsyk concluded. “Victory will obviously mean the restoration of territorial integrity and sovereignty, further reparations for the damage and the bringing of justice to the aggressor.”

Read last year’s perspective piece “Notre Dame experts weigh in on Russian invasion of Ukraine” posted on Feb. 24, 2022, the day the war began.

To view the Nanovic Institute for European 91��Ƶ’ “The war in Ukraine: Reassessing the Russian invasion” flash panel from Jan. 25, click .