In recent weeks, Taiwan has become a hot topic among world leaders, especially within Washington. Taiwan鈥檚 president, Tsai Ing-wen, visited California last week to meet with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, which prompted China to send warships and warplanes to surround the island and simulate bombing raids and military drills. This week鈥檚 threats from China to close down the airspace around Taiwan for three days leading up to the May G7 summit in Japan caused further strains and consternation. Many experts see these aggressive moves as foreshadowing a possible forced annexation of Taiwan by China, which considers the island part of its territory.听
These Notre Dame experts consider this attention turned toward Taiwan and what it means for U.S.-China relations from legal, strategic, militaristic, tactical and political standpoints.
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No international law has been broken by simulated actions
, the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and research professor of international dispute resolution, says simulating military attacks as China is doing in the context of Taiwan is no straightforward violation of international law.
鈥淭hey do not compare with Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine,鈥� she said. 鈥淭he U.N. Charter prohibits both threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. China鈥檚 simulations are classifiable as 鈥榯hreats to the peace鈥� and those, unlike invasion and other actual uses of force, may not violate the international law protecting Taiwan. The charter鈥檚 prohibition on the use of actual force is a codified version of ancient moral and legal principles. It does not change and cannot be undermined regardless of persistent state violations. It reaches beyond members of the U.N.鈥�
O鈥機onnell says 鈥渢hreats鈥� are less concrete and less subject to a peremptory prohibition.
鈥淪tates constantly undermine the prohibition on threats,鈥� she said. 鈥淩ecall Donald Trump鈥檚 threats of 鈥榝ire and fury鈥� against North Korea in August 2017. Many states also consider U.S. military exercises to be threats. It is hard to say the ban on threats is binding today. And then there is the problem that Taiwan is not a member of the U.N. To enjoy protection from the use of force, Taiwan needs to rely on the ancient legal prohibition beyond the charter.听
鈥淎ll of this means that the U.S. has no right to use military force in a case of simulated action,鈥� she explained. 鈥淭he best option is to bolster the U.N. Charter鈥檚 other mandate on China, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully. Leading by example with strict compliance with ancient and charter-based law is the way forward.鈥�
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The US should prepare for possible blockades on Taiwan
, associate professor of political science, holds expertise in east Asian security, U.S.-China relations, Chinese history and Hong Kong. She recalled when the U.S. simultaneously sent senior officials and members of Congress to both Taiwan and China over a year ago, indicating that the U.S. was edging away from strategic ambiguity and moving closer to strategic clarity. Since then, of course, former Speaker Nancy Pelosi also visited Taipei.听
鈥淧resident Biden has repeatedly stated that the U.S. would come to Taiwan鈥檚 military assistance if Taiwan is under attack,鈥� Hui said. 鈥淎nd each time, the White House spokesperson would reiterate the U.S.鈥檚 adherence to the 鈥極ne China鈥� policy. Tsai鈥檚 recent high-level meetings and trips demonstrate the U.S.鈥檚 new policy of unspoken/de facto strategic clarity under the de jure 鈥榦ne China鈥� pledge.鈥�
This move, Hui said, is intended to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from invading Taiwan without the need to actually use the military. 鈥淏eijing has reacted as if strategic clarity had become the official policy,鈥� Hui explained. 鈥淚t has demonstrated that it can impose a blockade on Taiwan. If conflicts break out, the most likely scenario is a blockade/siege, rather than direct military confrontations and an amphibious landing (to be saved for when Taiwan is subdued).听
鈥淭he U.S. should be making plans on how to supply and support Taiwan in case of a prolonged blockade to force Taiwan into submission.鈥澨�
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鈥楻estless, but not reckless, behavior鈥�
Lionel Jensen, an associate professor of East Asian languages and cultures and concurrent associate professor of history, said that while there is cause for concern, China鈥檚 actions amount to 鈥渞estless, but not reckless, behavior.鈥澨�
An expert on Chinese nationalism, Jensen said what is needed now is a proper contextualization of China鈥檚 reaction.
鈥淚t was termed a 鈥榤easured hardline鈥� by official China media. This is not ominous but routine,鈥� he said. 鈥淭hese exercises are similar 鈥斕齛lthough not as extensive 鈥� as those conducted in early August in response to former Speaker Nancy Pelosi鈥檚 visit to Taiwan. Then, Taiwan鈥檚 Air Defense Identification Zone, the 鈥榤ediating line,鈥� was crossed dozens of times and two missiles were shot over Taiwan into the Sea of Japan.鈥�
These recent exercises also provided an opportunity for China to show off its improved aircraft carriers, Jensen noted, which could potentially be used to escalate tensions in the South China Sea.
鈥淥f greater concern is the extent to which the aircraft carrier will be used in the South China Sea dispute that鈥檚 been ongoing since 2015,鈥� he said, 鈥渁nd whether China will now begin to move in greater force with its weaponry into the different islands they鈥檝e occupied there.鈥�
Jensen said the most dangerous aspect of the simulations in Taiwan is the prospect of an accident:听a misfired missile or a collision between aircraft or ships.
鈥淚t鈥檚 important to note that every time China conducts such exercises over and around Taiwan, the latter scrambles its planes in defense against PRC (People鈥檚 Republic of China) fighter jets entering the Air Defense Zone 鈥斕齧ore than 50 times during the most recent Operation Joint Sword and almost 70 sorties last August,鈥� he said.
鈥淚n the end, it is essential that these activities be placed in the context of regular flights into Taiwan鈥檚 airspace that are conducted without the public relations pronouncements 鈥斕齰eiled threats 鈥� from the PRC Foreign Ministry and have been conducted periodically since the 1990s. China鈥檚 most recent actions are calculated, and the 鈥榤easured hardline鈥� and/or 鈥榮trong and resolute measures鈥� will continue to echo along the Taiwan Straits in the months ahead.鈥�
Both sides should refrain from provocation
is an associate professor of global affairs in the Keough 91视频 of Global Affairs and holds a concurrent appointment in the political science department. He says that U.S.-China relations appear to be trapped in a cycle of provocative action and reaction, with both sides showing a dangerously high tolerance for the risk of military conflict.
鈥淏eijing鈥檚 rhetorical and military response to the recent President Tsai visit is meant to underscore just how provocative it finds high-level interactions between top U.S. officials and the Taiwanese leadership,鈥� Jaros said. 鈥淲hile Speaker McCarthy stopped short of making a visit to Taipei, it was clear that even the decision to meet in California would be perceived by Beijing as part of a continued elevation of U.S.-Taiwan relations.
鈥淥f course, Beijing routinely fails to recognize the way its own actions 鈥� a sustained military buildup, aggressive and intrusive military exercises, its policies toward Hong Kong and continued threats of coercion against Taiwan and any countries that would aid Taiwan 鈥� have altered the status quo ante in the Taiwan Strait and driven the U.S. and Taiwan closer.鈥澨�
Jaros said the U.S. should continue decrying efforts by China to use threats of military coercion to achieve its objectives in the Taiwan Strait, especially high-risk forms of military intimidation such as the recent waves of military exercises. However, the U.S. government also needs to rethink its approach to the Taiwan issue if the goal is to limit unintentional war.听
鈥淭his means avoiding highly provocative symbolic gestures in favor of quieter, but more substantive, ways of deterring military action against Taiwan,鈥� Jaros explained, 鈥渟uch as continuing efforts to solidify regional alliances and partnerships and bolster Taiwan鈥檚 defensive capacity.鈥�
Given that the U.S.-China blame game is unlikely to end anytime soon and high-level cooperation is severely restricted at present, Jaros said it is incumbent on each side to take unilateral steps to lower the political temperature and reduce the risk of conflict.听
鈥淔or the U.S., this does not mean backing down from existing treaty commitments or established security commitments abroad, but refraining from unnecessarily provocative gestures and signaling that we understand 鈥� even if we do not agree with 鈥� China鈥檚 key concerns.鈥�